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1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 16853 
that it does lead us tov:ard a brighter 
and more peaceful world . 
After the co !deration of all this tes-
timony-as w stated originally in the 
report of the cparedness Investigatmg 
CommHtee, wl reference to this phase 
of our hearln s-we concluded solidly 
that this treat would deny us the nec-
essary opport lUes to test fully and 
and fully meet r military reqmrements, 
and that any the prospective positive 
and constmct ·e gains resulting from 
the treaty did ot overcome those losses 
or dLSadvanla• s and d1d not justify our 
giving up wh we are having to sur-
r ender and wh we w1ll surrender under 
the terms o! t treaty. 
Therefore, . President, I remain of 
the opinion an the final conclusion that 
the treaty do jeopardlze our security 
and should no at. this t1me be approved 
and ratified. 
I WlSh espec lly to commend the dis-
tinguished m nty leader [Mr. MANs-
FIELD] althou others deserve com-
m endation, tor the very fine way in 
which he has dled this extensive and 
very import debate preceding what 
perhaps will b the most important vote 
in the Senate many years . So I com-
mend him ve highly for the very fine 
way in which e has performed his du-
ties and carrie out ·s obligations. Cer-
t ainly he u have the greatest 
confidence spect o! the Senator 
f rom Miss1ssl 1 and of all the other 
Mem bers of this body. I thank him tor 
yleldlng this time to me. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
yield myself 20 minutes. 
The PRESIDlNG OFFICER. The 
Senator from Montana is recognized for 
20 mtnutes. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. First, Mr. Presi-
dent, I wish to thank the Senator from 
Mississippi for his kind word and for his 
unfailing courtesty, consideration, and 
graciousness during the many ditncult 
days we have had while the Senate has 
been considering the treaty. It is true 
t hat this has not been one of the great 
debates of the century; but I believe that 
in m any respects it has been of more 
fundamental slgni.flcance and of greater 
importance, because in my opinion no 
other treaty in which this country has 
been invohed has been gone into so 
deeply and so thoroughly and by so many 
Senators, as is evident from the fact that 
three Senate committees held hearings 
on the treaty for several weeks, and from 
t he further !act that the Senate Pre-
p aredness Investigating SubcommitLee, 
under the chairmaruhip of the able and 
distinguished Senator from Mississippi, 
held hearings for an e\·en longer period 
of time on the m1htary a<pects of this 
p rogram. 
No'.V we ha\'!~ bc!'n told, if we can be-
lie\'C the news lickcrs-:md I believe the 
statement is true-that, as of now, ap-
proximately 100 nations have formally 
rati.fled or signed the test ban treaty. W e 
know that six nations-France, Commu-
nist China, Albania, North Vietnam, 
North Korea, and Cuba-have given no 
indication that they will sign the treaty. 
I n fact, I believe exactly the oppos1te 
will be the case-that they will not slgn 
the treaty. 
Now the hour of decision is at hand. 
Tomorrow, at 10:30 a .m ., the Senate will 
vote on this most momentous treaty, 
which will mean so much tn the lives of 
the people of this Nation and tn the lives 
of the peoples of the world. 
Mr. Presiden t, tha t the record may be 
straight, let me say that it should show 
that this treaty reflects the j udgment not 
only of this Democratic administration 
b ut of lts predecessor R epublican ad -
nunistra tion. It is a tr ibute to the per-
sisten ce for peace on the part of Mr. 
Eisenhov.er no less than Mr. Ketmedy. 
The record sh ould show. too, that 
Members of U1is body have played an lm-
m erue role in the conception of this 
treaty, a.nd in sh aping it and in bring'in g 
it to this moment of ultima te decision. 
In this connection, I think of th e work of 
the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. 
HUMPHREY], the distinguished Whip and 
chairman of the Senate S ubcommittee 
on Disarmament, of the wor k of the Sen -
ator from Tennessee [ Mr. GoREJ, the 
Senator from Alabama [Mr SPARKMAN], 
the ranking Republican member of the 
Foreir-n Relatioru Committee. the Sena-
tor f rom Iowa [Mr. HtCKENLOOPERJ, the 
senior Senator from Vermont [Mr. 
AIKEN], and oth ers who have observed 
the actual process of negotiation over the 
years, on behalf of the Senate and made 
sign ificant contributions. I think of the 
work o! the Senator from Idaho [Mr. 
CHURCH l, and the Senator !rom Con-
necticutt [Mr. DoDD], whose creative 
conceptions were in accord with the mod-
ifications which u ltimately produced 
agreement. 
I think of th e bipartisan contribution 
of the Senators who journeyed to Moscow 
to witness the signing of the treaty-Mr. 
AIKEN, Mr. SALTONSTALL, Mr. PASTORE, 
Mr . SPARKMAN, Mr. FULBRIC:HT, and Mr. 
H UMPHREY. 
I think of the Senator f rom Georgia 
[Mr. RuSSELL]. the Senator from Ari-
zona fMr. GOLDWATER], the Senator from 
Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS]. the Senator 
from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND] , 
and the Senator from Maine lMrs. 
SMITH], all distinguished experts in mili-
tary matters, whose penet rating ques-
tioru have compPI!ed all of us to shar pen 
our understanding of this step. The 
RECORD should r efl ect their contribu-
tioru. 
And it should refl ect, too. Mr. Presi-
dent, the work of the great ch airman of 
the Committee on Foreign R elatlol'IS 
[Mr. Fm.BRIGHTl. In considering this 
treaty, he guided not only th e member s 
of that commit tee but th e Sena tors of the 
Armed Services Committee and the J oint 
Committee on Atomic Energy in one of 
the most profound, impartial, and thor-
ough studies ever conducted by an agency 
of the Senate. I can recall of no other 
occasion in which the Senate was better 
equipped by the work of its committee 
to proceed, fully inform ed and with due 
deliberatiOn to decision. 
Finally, Mr P resident, I wish to allude 
to the contribution of th e great Ameri-
can who sits across the aisle, to the Sen-
ator from lllinois, the dlsti.ngu.ished mi-
nority leader [Mr. DIRKSENl. He with-
held his j ud.gment until h e had fully in-
formed hinlSelf on thls treaty, until he 
had pondered its implications, not to his 
party, not to himself but to the Nation 
and to the living generat!oru and those 
yet to come. When he knew in his mind 
and in his heart that it was right, then 
and only then, dld he decide. And once 
having <lecided, he was as a rock of gran-
ite, impervious to the storms of criticism 
wh ich beat about him. 
The Senator from Tilinois is a great 
American. And, Mr. President, he could 
not be a great American unless he were 
also an understanding and compassion-
ate human being. His guidance. his re-
assurance, his wisdom, In this instance. 
increases the debt which the leadership 
owes to him, and which the Senate and 
the Nation as a whole owe the Senator 
from Illinois for his high patriotic public 
service. 
Mr. President, shortly we will vote on 
the question of advice and consent to the 
rat ification of the nuclear test ban 
treaty. What needed saying on this 
treaty has been said again and again in 
comlll.ittee and on the floor. It ought to 
be clear by this time that not a single 
Senate proponent favors the treaty, be-
cause he believes that the Russians have 
signed it out of love lor the United 
States. There are no dupes in the Senate 
on that score. The Russians have their 
own reasoru for signing this treaty. 
They are not necessarilY reasons o! m111-
tary advantage at all although that pos-
sibility has been discussed thoroughly. 
Indeed, one does not have to search far 
tor plausible reasons for the Russian 
signature. 
Mr. Khrushchev has his share of in-
t ernal difficulties. The Soviet-Canadian 
wheat deal of Canadian wheat for $500 
million is one example. The Russian 
people are consumers, too, and nucleon-
ics is not yet a substitute for n].ltrition. 
The race to the moon is not yet produc-
ing edible green cheese. Missiles are not 
yet delivering milk. Nuclear fallout does 
not drop as the gentle rain on parched 
a gricultural lands. 
And if internal difficulties are insuffi-
cient to explain the Russian acceptance 
of th ls treaty, we may find other reasons 
in Mr. Khrushchev's external difficulties 
and, particularlY. in the Soviet relation-
ship with China. The Soviet Unlon is 
confronted with a mllitant and hostile 
ideological challenge from the Chinese. 
I t Is confronted with a China which lays 
grea t stress on its racial affinjty with all 
Asians as against European Russia. It 
is confronted with growing Chinese ter-
ritor ial pressures in Central Asia. In this 
connection it should be noted that the 
Sunday papers cany the reports from 
Moscow tha t Russia charges that its 
frontier was violated by China 5,000 
times in 1962. And also in this connec-
tion I ask un animous coruent that there 
be printed at the end of my remarks an 
editorial appearing in the New York Her-
ald Tribune dated September 23 and a 
statement which I made on September 6 
referring to t he Sino-Soviet border issue 
as, possibly, a major motivation in the 
Russian interest In the nuclear test ban 
t reaty. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 
objection, It Is so ordered. 
(See exhibits 1 and 2.> 
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r.Ir MANSFIELD. In short, Mr. Pr<'sl-
d nt quite apart. from military matters, 
th rl.' are any number of plausible reasons 
ror the soviet Union to want this treaty 
v. lth the United Stnt<'s. But that Is the 
b 1 !ness of the Russians. It is not ours 
F1 om our point of \;ew, there arc simi-
lar valid 1easons for seeking this trea~y. 
w~ do liOt haYC to love the Russians to 
see the ad\antages of this treaty. We 
lla \ r only to recognize what unrestricted 
t<'stin" of nuclear weapons. Jet alone nu-
ciNir warfare itself. may do to the civlli-
zatiOn v.e know and to the health of the 
people of the United States, particularly 
to youn<>er generations here and on the 
way Is that m Itself not sufficient 1 ea-
son for seeking this treaty? 
Let no Member forget that this treaty 
was proposed and pursued, not by Mr. 
Khrushchev, but by President Eisenhow-
er and by President Kennedy In succes-
sion. And let no Member suggest that 
they pursued It-and none has-becau~e 
they are fools or careless or not as wise 
or as well informed as Senators in these 
matters. And let no Member suggest-
and none has-that these Presidents pur-
sued t.he treaty for any reason ot.her than 
that they were convinced that, on bal-
ance, 1t is In the interests of the United 
State:<, first and foremost. 
Now it is possible to disagree with the 
judgment o! two Presidents in succession. 
That is what the constitutional practice 
of ratification Is designed to permit, and 
I question no Senator's motives 1!, In his 
judgment, he votes in the end for the re-
Jection of this treaty. 
But I would plead with those who are 
so inclined to consider one last time what 
the failure to ratify this treaty would 
mean. 
It would mean the resumption of tests 
in the atmosphere and on the sea, not 
only by the United States but by the So-
viet Union as well, with consequent rise 
in the exposure to radlation-lnduced 
sicknesses of our people as well as others. 
It would Insure a marked Increase In 
defense expendltures and, hence. in the 
already heaVY burdens of the U.S. tax-
payer. For, if we cannot ta.ke this step 
toward security by an instrument of 
peace, then It follows that we had better 
put more of our resources Into the In-
struments of war. For that is precisely 
what others will also be doing, as the 
fears and antagonisms multiply In the 
fertile soil of a sanctioned International 
nuclear anarchy. 
To reject this treaty would be to pre-
cipitate a worldwide revUlsion among the 
dozens of nations who have followed the 
leadership of this Nation for many years 
and who have already signed this treaty 
in good faith. 
To reject this treaty, Mr. President. 
will be to snuff out that fiicker of light 
which for a brief moment lit the rational 
and reasonable hopes of the Nation and 
thew rid. 
It will. in short. bring an end to the 
hope for a more reliable peace through 
negotiations. and properly so. For it 
will make clear that jiYhile th~ President 
does not fear to negotiate, lhe Senate 
fears the consequences of negotiations 
which are finally successful. It will 
make clear that we reject these conse-
quences even when they are most cir-
ct:mscrlbed. even when we have taken 
all poss1ble steps to guard a alnst he 
risks. 
These are some of the considerations 
which I would hope the Senate vall bear 
in mind as we procN•d t.o the final vo~ 
on tomolTow mormng. And may I say, 
Mr. Presiden . that the responsibility for 
th1s decision is not BS$Jgnable to any sci-
enlist or milltary or CIVIlian official of 
the Go\·ernment. This moment Is for 
elected Senators alone. It is, for us to 
dec1de to join with or lo rrfuse to join 
\\ 1th an elected President to safeguard 
throu~h the treaty the mt<'rests of the 
people and the States which we repre-
SPnt. 
W11I we consent to put this very lun-
it<'d but firm brake upon the headlong 
race toward the nuclear inferno? Can 
we afford to take this chance? Indeed. 
Mr Pres1dent, can we alford not to take 
It? 
Mr. President, I yield back the re-
mainder of the time. 
EXHIBIT 1 
[From the New York Herald Tnbune, Sept. 
23, 1963] 
SPARKS ON THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER 
Of r•ll the former imperallst powers which 
had helped themselves to slices of Chinese 
territory during the open door free-for-all 
period, only one remains with extensive hold-
Ings on the Asian mainland. It Is Russia. 
Ideological debates are one thing. but they 
are largely verbal and Intellectual. Real es-
tate 1s quite another. It is something to 
which all good Communists, llke the capital· 
lsts they denounce, attaCh great value. 
Pelptng may or may not be sincere In its 
Ideological debate with Moscow. But there is 
now little doubt tb&t 1t Is deadly serious 
about Its cla.lms to Chinese territory which 
the czars had conquered and which the pres-
ent Communist rulers of Russia had 
Inherited. 
The Chinese have embarked on a course 
which, if continued. could lead to a denun-
ciation of the Peiplng treaty of 1860, ex-
tracted from the Manchu emperor by a wily 
Russian envoy of the czar. The treaty fixed 
the present Sino-Soviet frontier-a frontier 
which the Chinese refuse to honor. 
This Is proved by the disclosure, In an om-
cia! Soviet Government statement, tb&t the 
Mao Tse-tung regime has attempted "to ap-
propriate individual sections of Soviet ter-
ritory" and bact violated the border 5,000 
times during 1962 alone. 
There have been border clashes between 
Russians and Chinese throughout their his-
tory. It Is not unlikely, in the light of the 
extraordinary Soviet disclosure, that these 
clashes have been resumed and have grown 
to serious proportions during 1962 and 1963. 
The renewal of physical conflict (as dis-
tinct from ideological conflict) goes a long 
way toward explaining the sudden Soviet in-
terest In coming to an understanding with 
the Western Powers. We may now have an 
opportunity to extract concessions which pre-
viously were beyond our reach. Let's hope 
President Kennedy and his Secretary of State 
mnke good use of it 
September :!3 
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